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This review concentrates on the role of information asymmetry in ﬁ  nancial markets 
in the ampliﬁ  cation and propagation of short-run output ﬂ  uctuations. We ﬁ  nd that 
the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect, as it is known, provides a consistent, ﬁ  rst princi-
ple based, theoretical framework for the analysis of the relationship between ﬁ  -
nancial markets and short-run output ﬂ  uctuations. It also provides a plausible 
explanation of the proximate causes of the recent crisis, and ﬁ  rst principle-based 
theoretical background for the credit policy measures taken during this crisis by 
many central banks and ﬁ  scal authorities. Despite the theoretical plausibility, the 
empirical evidence about the economic importance of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect is still relatively weak. We also suggest two new aspects to expand existing 
concept of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect, which call for further research.
Keywords: asymmetric information, ﬁ  nancial markets imperfections, ﬁ  nancial ac-
celerator, business cycles
1 introduction
In 1988 Mark Gertler summarized the stance of macroeconomic literature in the 
following sentence; Most of macroeconomic theory presumes that the ﬁ  nancial 
system functions smoothly – and smoothly enough to justify abstracting from ﬁ  -
nancial considerations (Gertler, 1988:559). Twenty years after, the severe conse-
quences of the worst ﬁ  nancial crisis since the Great Depression have drawn atten-
tion of a broader economic community to the idea that episodes of deteriorating 
credit market conditions, growing debt burdens and falling asset prices in ﬁ  nan-
cial markets are not just passive reﬂ  ections of a declining economy, but can them-
selves be a major factor depressing real economic activity. The potential for the 
active role of ﬁ  nancial markets in real economic activity was recognized and ex-
tensively investigated in the macroeconomic literature over the last two decades. 
Most of these researches have focused on the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. 
This literature essentially incorporates the partial equilibrium analyses about in-
formation-based imperfections on ﬁ  nancial markets into a general equilibrium 
framework. The idea that the asymmetric information-based imperfections in ﬁ  -
nancial markets can inﬂ  uence short-run aggregate economic activity was sugge-
sted by Bernanke (1983). In particular, Bernanke (1983) argued that the credit 
squeeze during the great depression arose mainly from the autonomous reaction 
of the banking sector to increased real costs of intermediation caused by worse-
ning asymmetric information problems in the ﬁ  nancial markets during this period. 
In other words, the credit squeeze was not just the passive response of decreasing 
demand for loans due to the decline in economic activity. Despite this early work, 
it was only after Bernanke and Gertler (1989) formalized this idea in a general 
equilibrium framework that it attracted the broader attention of the economic au-
dience. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) constructed a general equilibrium model 






















































































































173 ceed from ﬁ  rst principles, and in which short-run output ﬂ  uctuations are ampliﬁ  ed 
and propagated due to information-based credit market frictions.
This study reviews and discusses a growing literature on the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect. The review is organized in ﬁ  ve sections. Section two presents the theoreti-
cal rationale for the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. Section three discusses different 
ways to model this effect. The fourth section deals with the role of the ﬁ  nancial 
accelerator in the monetary transmission mechanism. The ﬁ  fth section discusses 
the ﬁ  ndings and challenges this literature faces. The last section concludes. 
2 THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR EFFECT 
Short-run output ﬂ  uctuations have usually been considered a result of various 
economic shocks, which are further transmitted by different propagation mecha-
nisms. One of the common ways of thinking about the generation of output move-
ments over a short-run period is an autoregressive (AR) process (see for example: 
Blanchard and Simon, 2001),1
 
    (1)
where ∆yt stands for growth rates of output. φ is the autoregression coefﬁ  cient 
whose value measures the persistence of the effects of economic disturbances on 
output. The error term ut symbolizes economic shocks. Under the assumption that 
the regression error term follows a normal distribution and that the absolute value 
of the autoregression coefﬁ  cient is less than one2, output variance is, 
   
(2)
Consequently, the size of short-run output volatility depends on the size of econo-
mic shocks (size of economic shocks standard deviation,  ) and strength of the 
propagation mechanism (size of autoregression coefﬁ  cient, φ).
Identiﬁ  cation of economic shocks and propagation mechanisms sufﬁ  ciently large 
to explain short-run volatility observed in macroeconomic time series has been the 
main issue of business cycle literature. The term ﬁ  nancial accelerator is used for 
the economic shocks ampliﬁ  cation and propagation mechanism, which aims to 
1 There are number of different univariate models that strive to find the best statistical representation for short-
run properties of output time series. The AR(1) model is chosen in order to make the exposition simple and 
because it has become a standard reference point for these models. Furthermore, Hess and Iwata (1997) found 
that an AR(1) process is at least as good as, if not better than, other widely used nonlinear models at replicat-
ing business-cycle features of the US GDP.
2 The assumption that   is necessary to keep the variance of time series generated by an AR(1) process 
positive and finite. This assumption should not be considered as restrictive since that kind of variance and the 
size of the autoregressive coefficient is commonly observed in output data across countries (see, for exam-
ple, Ćorić, 2011). Namely, autoregression coefficient   will result in infinitely large variance, which is 






















































































































174 explain how relatively small economic shocks can have large and persistent ef-
fects on aggregate economic activity due to ﬁ  nancial market imperfections. In the 
original Bernanke and Gertler (1989) formulation, it relies on the interplay 
between economic agents’ net worth and the external ﬁ  nance premium that arises 
due to asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.3 Where economic 
agents’ net worth is deﬁ  ned as: the sum of liquid assets plus collateral value of 
illiquid assets less outstanding obligations; and the external ﬁ  nance premium is 
deﬁ  ned as: the difference between the cost of funds raised externally and opportu-
nity costs internal to the ﬁ  rm (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999:1345). The 
relationship between the external ﬁ  nance premium and agents’ net worth is com-
monly acknowledged as the keystone of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator. This relation 
rests on two presumptions (Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). 
First, the less the amount of his own wealth the borrower contributes to the project, 
the more his interests will diverge from the interests of the supplier of the external 
funds. There are two basic explanations for this presumption. The ﬁ  rst one is rela-
ted to the theory of credit rationing and the role of collateral in loan agreements. 
In brief, in the case of debt ﬁ  nancing, borrowers will be more eager to undertake 
riskier projects. That is, projects that have a high probability of large return, but 
also those offering low returns. From the borrower’s perspective these projects are 
preferred since the ﬁ  rms’ losses in the cases when the project’s return is low are 
limited to zero by legal regulation (limited liability assumption). From the len-
ders’ point of view, these projects are unfavourable since they bear all, or most of, 
the costs in the case of low project returns. Implicit4 or explicit collateral require-
ments reduce this divergence of interest between lenders and borrowers; collate-
ral, or the level of own funds with which the borrower participates in the project, 
increases the costs the borrower will face in the case of low project returns. This 
way they will make borrowers less eager to undertake riskier projects that are seen 
as unfavourable from the lenders’ point of view. So, as the borrowers’ net worth 
grows, the costs they have in the case of low returns increase and, hence, the di-
vergence of the interest between borrowers and lender should decrease (for details 
on the theory of credit rationing and the role of collateral in loan agreements see 
for example: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; and Besanko and Thakor, 
1987). According to another explanation, if ﬁ  rms take too much debt in relation to 
equity they will not have a sufﬁ  cient stake in the ﬁ  nancial outcome and might 
therefore not behave diligently. The higher the agents’ net worth in relation to the 
debt, the higher their stake in the ﬁ  nancial outcome and the greater their incentive 
to behave diligently, hence, lower the divergence of the interest between bor-
rowers and lenders (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
3 Although the formulation with external finance premium is most frequently used it is not the only possible 
approach, see below.
4 An implicit collateral requirement presumes borrower’s assets which are not explicitly assigned as collat-
eral to a lender but which the borrower will lose in the case of default. For example, the lender’s restriction 
that the maximal amount of a loan provided to a firm cannot exceed some percentage of its value, or some 






















































































































175 Second, in cases when the borrowers have superior information about projects’ 
characteristics (value, riskiness, etc.), or abilities to take unobserved actions that 
can affect projects’ return distribution, a greater incompatibility of interests 
between borrowers and lenders increases agency costs.5 What types of costs age-
ncy costs would include depends on the way the information asymmetry in the 
credit market is modelled (see below). In brief, if a model is built on the assump-
tion that information problems are solvable, then the agency costs will include 
costs of all real resources that the lender would be “forced” to spend to overcome 
these problems. On the other hand, if the underlying assumption is that those pro-
blems are not solvable, or at least not completely solvable, and credits are rationed 
in equilibrium, then agency costs will include the costs of suboptimal allocation 
of funds in the economy. So, the greater the incompatibility of interests between 
lenders and borrowers, the greater the extent of real resources spent on monito-
ring, selecting, etc., and/or the greater the extent of credit rationing in the eco-
nomy. Consequently, the greater the incompatibility of interests, the higher the 
interest rate and/or the lower availability of credits. 
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect can be described as follows (ﬁ  gure 1). A change 
in aggregate economic activity causes a change in economic agents’ net worth 
because of a positive correlation between them. Due to imperfect information, the 
terms under which economic agents are able to raise external ﬁ  nance, hence also 
the external ﬁ  nance premium, are inversely related to their net worth. In so far as 
the external ﬁ  nance premium is inversely related to economic agents’ net worth, 
the procyclical behaviour of economic agents’ net worth over business cycles 
implies countercyclical behaviour of the external ﬁ  nance premium. This inverse 
relation between output changes and the external ﬁ  nance premium makes bor-
rowing more difﬁ  cult and/or expensive during recession than during the expansio-
nary phase. This in turn exaggerates swings in investment, spending and produc-
tion over business cycles. For example, any negative economic shock that might 
lead to a decrease in economic agents’ net worth would also increase the external 
ﬁ  nance premium. Consequently, due to higher costs, and/or reduced ability to 
borrow, the overall level of agents’ investments, spending and production will 
decrease. In turn, that will depress the economy even further. 
Economic disturbances that can be ampliﬁ  ed and propagated by the ﬁ  nancial ac-
celerator mechanism include all shocks that cause: changes in the value of econo-
mic agents’ liquid assets (change in cash position, short-term ﬁ  nancial asset, etc.), 
such as, a change in productivity, a change in aggregate demand caused by a de-
crease in money supply, a decrease in foreign demand, etc.; changes in the value 
5 Agency costs are a broad range of different costs that arise in all economic transactions where the parties 
involved in those relations have different interests and where their actions are not observable, or at least not 
costlessly observable by all transaction participants. They are the wedge between the so-called first best and 
the second best solution. That is, the difference between costs of the transaction that takes place between two 
parties in situations in which the information is equally shared and costless, and the costs of the same trans-






















































































































176 of economic agents’ illiquid assets, that can arise due to either a change in interest 
rate or a change in the asset prices both of which can be caused by actions of eco-
nomic policy makers or by changes in the expectations about future economic 
performance, etc.; change in economic agents’ outstanding obligations can also be 
caused by a change in the interest rate, under the assumption that outstanding 
loans are subject to variable interest rates. 
FIGURE 1
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect
The arrows symbolize the mechanisms (channels) through which the financial accelerator opera-
tes, and the boxes represent events and their consequences for the economy. Arrow 1 represents 
a positive relationship between changes in aggregate economic activity and agents’ net worth. 
In turn, Arrow 2 represents an inverse relationship between net worth and the size of the exter-
nal finance premium. Arrow 3 represents an inverse relationship between the external financial 
premium and investment, spending and production. Finally, the return arrows represent pro-cyc-
lical feedback into aggregate economic activity.
3 MODELLING STRATEGIES
The different modelling approaches to the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect reﬂ  ect: the 
variety of different situations in which the asymmetric information problem 
between borrowers and lenders may emerge; different ﬁ  nancial markets in which 
this problem can appear; different attitudes toward the question whether partici-
pants in ﬁ  nancial markets can overcome the problem of asymmetrically distribu-
ted information or not; and different types of borrowers whose economic activities 
can be inﬂ  uenced by ﬁ  nancial market imperfections.
3.1 DIFFERENCES IN MODELLING INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY
In general, it is possible to distinguish three major types of modelling strategies 
used by researchers to incorporate the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect into general 
equilibrium models (the main differences among these approaches are summari-
sed at the end of this section in the table 1). The ﬁ  rst two approaches, established 
by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moor (1997), consider informa-
tional asymmetry on credit markets as the cause of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. 
The third approach, established by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) considers infor-























































































































177 Differences between the ﬁ  rst two approaches, which concentrate on credit markets, 
arise due to the variety of situations in which informational asymmetry between 
ultimate savers and investors on the credit markets may be evident, and differen-
ces in the underlying assumption taken by these authors with respect to the que-
stion whether participants in ﬁ  nancial markets can overcome the problem of 
asymmetrically distributed information or not.
In particular, the asymmetric information problem can emerge because borrowers’ 
intentions, or honesty, or project riskiness, or project quality, or any combination 
of these characteristics is not observable to lenders before transactions take place 
(ex-ante asymmetric information problems). Once the transaction has taken place, 
lenders may not be able to observe borrowers’ actions, project return or duration, 
or to force borrowers to repay loans (ex-post asymmetric information problems) 
(Jaffe and Stiglitz, 1990). A model that would include all the possible scenarios in 
which an asymmetric information problem may arise as sources of the ﬁ  nancial 
accelerator effect would be extremely complicated, very difﬁ  cult to build and hi-
ghly intractable. The strategy adopted by researchers has been to use one particu-
lar formulation of asymmetric information problems as representative of all sce-
narios and to assume a priori whether or not those problems are solvable. As a 
result, different models have different formulations of the agency costs and the 
external ﬁ  nance premium.
The assumption that asymmetric information problems between borrowers and 
lenders are solvable implies that the lenders would use various techniques to deal 
with this problem: for example, screening; selecting among borrowers; monito-
ring (inspection of borrowers’ cash ﬂ  ows, balance sheet position, management, 
realized return, etc.); engaging in a long-term relationship with borrowers; and 
enforcement of restrictive covenants such as a minimum solvency ratio or a mini-
mum cash balance, etc. The use of all these instruments requires lenders’ real re-
sources and entails real costs for which lenders have to be compensated in equili-
brium. Therefore, even in the cases when these techniques are able to reveal all the 
hidden or unobservable borrower characteristics, their implementation makes ex-
ternal sources of ﬁ  nance expensive to the borrower compared to the use of internal 
ﬁ  nance, where these costs are not present. The difference between these two sour-
ces of funds will be expressed in the form of the higher interest rate borrowers will 
be asked to pay. The external ﬁ  nance premium will in this case take the form of 
the difference between the interest rate on the external source of ﬁ  nance that 
age  nts with low net worth would be charged compared to the interest rate those 
agents would be charged in the situation where their net worth is high. 
On the other hand, the assumption that asymmetric information problems between 
borrowers and lenders are not solvable implies that the borrowers would not always 
be able to obtain credit, or at least not the amount considered optimal from their 






















































































































178 me asymmetric information problems by screening, monitoring and other techni-
ques, they might ration credit not by price but by quantity (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). In these cases, some borrowers will not be able to obtain funds even though 
their investment projects have a positive net present value (NPV). Under this as-
sumption, external funds will cost even less than the ﬁ  rms are willing to pay, but 
they will be unavailable. The marginal productivity of ﬁ  rms’ internal funds will be 
higher than the marginal costs of external funds, but the ﬁ  rms will not be able to 
borrow enough funds to equalize this difference. Hence, ﬁ  rms, and the overall 
economy, will be forced to produce inefﬁ  ciently, that is, below the level where 
marginal productivity meets marginal costs. In those cases the external ﬁ  nance 
premium will take the form of the difference between the marginal value of the 
ﬁ  rms’ internal funds and the marginal costs of the external funds, and will contain 
the costs of all the wasted resources and missed production opportunities. 
The majority of the literature has adopted Bernanke and Gertler’s (1989) approach 
(see for example: Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999; Aoki et al., 
2004; Elekdag et al., 2006; Gertler et al., 2007; Christiansen and Dib, 2008; Portes 
and Ozenbas, 2009; von Heideken, 2009; Magud, 2010; Freedman et al., 2010; 
Calvalcanti, 2010). To model the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect, Bernanke and Ger-
tler (1989) applied Townsend’s (1979) costly state veriﬁ  cation hypothesis. This 
hypothesis thesis states that the problems caused by asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders arise from the fact that lenders are not able to ob-
serve borrowers’ project return realizations cost-free. The borrowers can report 
false project results (declare default) to mitigate debt obligations and retain the 
difference between reported and realized project returns. Due to this possibility 
lenders are forced to implement return veriﬁ  cation in cases in which borrowers 
declare bankruptcy. Since the implementation of return veriﬁ  cation procedure is 
costly, to minimize costs lenders implement a random veriﬁ  cation procedure, 
which constitutes a realistic threat of being caught to cheaters. An inverse rela-
tionship between the external ﬁ  nance premium and net worth comes from the 
point that the low borrower’s net worth means that the borrower has less to lose in 
the case of fraud. Namely, since lenders apply return veriﬁ  cation procedures only 
to some of the ﬁ  rms that declare bankruptcy, borrowers have the incentive to re-
port false project results. The costs borrowers will have when they declare 
bankruptcy are equal to the value of their net worth plus reported project return. 
On the other hand, the potential (expected) beneﬁ  ts of fraud are equal to the diffe-
rence between realized and reported project returns multiplied by the probability 
they will not be caught. So, in a case in which borrowers’ net worth decreases, the 
costs they will have if they report fake project returns will also decrease. Since the 
potential beneﬁ  ts of fraud stayed unchanged, borrowers’ incentive to report false 
project results will rise. To prevent potential losses due to dishonest behaviour, 
lenders should reduce the beneﬁ  ts borrowers derive from fraud. The way lenders 
can reduce these beneﬁ  ts is to increase the proportion of borrowers in the group of 






















































































































179 will be applied. That is, to increase the probability that cheaters will be caught. 
Since auditing imposes real costs on lenders, they will require higher interest rates 
to compensate for those costs. So, in circumstances when an adverse economic 
shock decreases borrowers’ net worth, the external source of ﬁ  nance will become 
more expensive. Consequently, investment, spending and production at the aggre-
gate level will decline. 
Another way of modelling the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect proceeds from formula-
tions in which lenders are not able to overcome information asymmetry. In parti-
cular, Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) assumed that asymmetric information problems 
are unsolvable since lenders are not able to enforce debt repayment by any means. 
Hence, lenders are not willing to lend if the loan is not completely secured by the 
value of borrowers’ durable assets (such as land, buildings, and machinery). In 
such an economy, credits will be rationed not just by price but by quantity as well, 
and ﬁ  rms’ ability to obtain loans will be directly dependent on the value of the 
collateral they can offer. Any shift in ﬁ  rms’ net worth, in these circumstances, 
inﬂ  uences signiﬁ  cantly their ability to raise external funds. The level of credit ra-
tioning will be countercyclical due to the procyclical value of collateralised assets. 
This will exaggerate swings in investment, spending and production over business 
cycles. So, in circumstances when adverse economic shocks decrease borrowers’ 
net worth, external sources of ﬁ  nance will become less available. Consequently, 
investment, spending and production at the aggregate level will decline. This ap-
proach is adopted and further developed by Kiyotaki (1998), Iacoviello (2005), 
Monacelli (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Martin and Ventura (2010). 
The third modelling strategy, which is somewhat different, but can still be conside-
red a way of incorporating the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect into the general equili-
brium framework, was established by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). Although 
this formulation does not rely on the existence of the external ﬁ  nancial premium, it 
still produces ampliﬁ  cation of aggregate economic ﬂ  uctuations due to informatio-
nal asymmetry in ﬁ  nancial markets and the procyclicality of ﬁ  rms’ net worth. Na-
mely, in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) ﬁ  rms are allowed to raise funds on a fric-
tionless credit market, but are precluded from accessing the equity market. Limited 
access to the equity market is based on the asymmetric information considerations 
discussed by Greenwald et al. (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). In brief, in 
circumstances in which the ﬁ  rms’ managements have “better” information about 
the true value of the ﬁ  rms’ existing assets and/or investment projects, the ﬁ  rms’ 
decisions to issue shares signals “bad news” to investors. Conversely, the ﬁ  rms’ 
decisions not to issue shares signals “good news” to investors. In particular, inve-
stors consider equity issue as a signal that the ﬁ  rms’ managements consider exi-
sting share prices to be overvalued. Since investors do not have full information 
about the ﬁ  rms’ true value, they consider every equity issue in the same way. The 
consequence is that equity issue typically decreases the ﬁ  rm’s share price, indepen-






















































































































180 when a project’s NPV is positive, ﬁ  rms will often be reluctant to issue new shares 
and invest, because the decrease in share prices can outweigh increase in value 
arising from the project’s positive NPV. Further, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) 
also assume that ﬁ  rms behave in such a manner as to minimize the probability of 
bankruptcy, since bankruptcy is costly for stockholders and especially for mana-
gers, due to loss of reputation. These costs induce ﬁ  rms to act in a risk-averse 
manner. Finally, ﬁ  rms operate in a stochastic environment where the outcome of 
every production and investment decision is uncertain. In an environment which is 
intrinsically stochastic and in which ﬁ  rms are risk-averse, changes in ﬁ  rms’ net 
worth position can have potentially large effects on their willingness to produce. 
For example, economic shocks that reduce ﬁ  rms’ net worth also reduce the level of 
their own funds with which the ﬁ  rm may contribute to investment in production. 
Consequently, if ﬁ  rms want to maintain the same level of investment in produc-
tion, they have to increase borrowing. Insofar as debt obligations are in the form of 
state-independent claims, a rise in the share of ﬁ  xed obligations in ﬁ  nancial sour-
ces, in a stochastic world, increases the probability of bankruptcy. Since ﬁ  rms are 
risk averse they will be reluctant to increase borrowing, but will rather decrease 
investment in production. Decreases in ﬁ  rms’ production get translated into de-
creases in the demand facing other ﬁ  rms, and through this mechanism shocks get 
transmitted further. Overall, similar to the previous models, ﬁ  nancial market im-
perfections will, due to net worth procyclicality, amplify changes in economic ac-
tivity over the business cycle. So far, this approach to modelling the ﬁ  nancial acce-
lerator effect has been adopted by Arnold (2002) and Gatti et al. (2007).
TABLE 1
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181 3.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF BORROWERS 
Another feature of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator literature is that almost all studies in 
this ﬁ  eld concentrate on one group of economic agents.6 Following Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) 
seminal contributions, the large majority of general equilibrium models in this 
ﬁ  eld concentrate on ﬁ  rms’ borrowing in the formulation of interactions between 
imperfect ﬁ  nancial markets and short-run economic ﬂ  uctuations. The general 
orientation of the literature toward explanation of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect 
through the behaviour of one group of economic agents (usually ﬁ  rms) is based on 
the intention to reduce technical concerns and keep models relatively simple to 
maintain tractability. This strategy is not a product of beliefs that the activity of 
other economic agents is not inﬂ  uenced by the same kind of ﬁ  nancial market im-
perfections. On the contrary, as Bernanke et al. (1999) emphasized, a complete 
description of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator mechanism will likely include a signiﬁ  cant 
role for non-ﬁ  rm borrowers such as households and banks. 
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect on household spending occurs because house-
holds, as well as ﬁ  rms, ﬁ  nance some of their expenditures by borrowing. In parti-
cular, households usually ﬁ  nance investments in housing and purchases of other 
durable goods by raising funds in credit markets. These ﬁ  nance transactions are 
also characterized by asymmetric information problems between the borrowers 
(households) and the lenders (banks). Therefore, households’ ability and/or terms 
under which they are able to obtain funds, hence their spending, are also inﬂ  uen-
ced by their net worth. Since empirically a large proportion of households’ bor-
rowings are secured by real estate, the literature has focused primarily on the ef-
fect of changes in house values (seminal contributions include: Aoki et al., 2002, 
2004; and Iacoviello, 2005). Aoki et al. (2004) described the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect on household spending as follows. A positive shock to economic activity 
causes a rise in house prices, which leads to an increase in homeowners’ net worth. 
This decreases the external ﬁ  nance premium, which leads to a rise in housing
investments and also spills over into consumption demand (spending on dura-
bles). Consequently, the same mechanism that propagates economic shocks through 
ﬁ  rms’ investments should also work through households’ spending and invest-
ments decisions. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the effect of the net 
worth changes on households’ investments should be even more pronounced than 
on the ﬁ  rms’, since households are unable to raise alternative sources of ﬁ  nance 
through equity or bond issues, but are exclusively oriented towards banks as the 
sources of external funds. 
Recently Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) developed a general equilibrium model in 
which the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect emerges due to an asymmetric information 
6 For a model which simultaneously combines the financial accelerator effect on firms’ and banks’ economic 
activity in a partial equilibrium environment see Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Iacoviello (2005) combines 






















































































































182 problem that constrains the ability of banks to obtain funds from depositors in 
retail as well as in wholesale (“inter-bank”) ﬁ  nancial markets. Since banks enter 
the deposit market as borrowers and given that they can go bankrupt as well as 
ﬁ  rms, there is no reason to assume that banks’ ability to collect funds and/or the 
costs of the funds will not be inﬂ  uenced by their net worth (bank capital). To the 
extent that the economic shocks affect banks’ net worth7 it might also affect banks’ 
ability to attract funds. Why does banks’ net worth matter for attracting funds? 
The reason is the same as before – information asymmetry. Depositors cannot 
observe how much risk banks are taking while investing their money. However, 
they know that bankruptcy is costly. Higher bank net worth implies larger costs of 
bankruptcy and, hence, lower incentive to take risk. Additionally, higher bank net 
worth means a more liquid bank, that is, a better ability to compensate unanticipa-
ted losses and again a lower probability of bankruptcy. In sum, depositors will be 
more willing and/or will request a lower deposit interest rate to put their money in 
bank with high net worth. They will also be more willing to “contribute” to bank 
capitalization by investing in bank’s issue of new shares if that bank has higher net 
worth. This is important because a negative effect of a reduction in banks’ net 
worth on loans supply can also be caused by banks’ intention to maintain a desired 
or imposed capital adequacy ratio (see below). Unlike that of ﬁ  rms and house-
holds, the economic activity of the banks does not consist of spending on durables 
and houses, or of production and investment. Yet, since banks ﬁ  nance these acti-
vities to a large extent, a change in their net worth can have an effect on aggre  gate 
spending, investment and production. The terms and amounts of the funds the 
banks collect directly determine the terms under which they lend, and the amo  unts 
they are able to offer to potential borrowers. Therefore, adverse changes in their 
net worth can cause credit tightening and negatively affect households’ and ﬁ  rms’ 
expenditure and overall economic activity. 
4 MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect has recently been used in many different areas of 
research, for example: Cepedes et al. (2004), Gertler et al. (2007) and Magud 
(2010), among others, analysed properties of different exchange rate regimes 
using the ﬁ  nancial accelerator framework; Olivero (2010) explored the relation-
ship between the ﬁ  nancial accelerator and international transmission of business 
cycles; Aghion et al. (2005) incorporated this effect in the analysis of the relation-
ship between output volatility and growth. Assuming that entrepreneurs raise funds 
on imperfect credit markets, Wasmer and Weil (2004) developed a theory of job 
creation and job destruction that suggests the existence of a ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect based on the general-equilibrium feedback between credit and labour 
market; Portes (2007), Portes and Ozenbas (2009), and Ćorić and Pugh (2011) 
explore the role of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect in the so-called great modera-
7 For example, negative economic shock can increase the non-performing loans rate and/or decrease the value 
of banks’ securities. In the case of the exogenously induced increase in interest rate banks can also suffer capi-






















































































































183 tion. Hirose (2008) investigated sources of asset price ﬂ  uctuation in Japan using 
this model. Using the general equilibrium model with ﬁ  nancial accelerator, Free-
dman et al. (2010) estimated the effects of ﬁ  scal stimuli during the crises. 
For example, in the monetary policy literature, the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect has 
been particularly intensively used. Almost in parallel with the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
theory there has been a development of literature that considers information-based 
ﬁ  nancial market imperfections as a channel through which monetary policy mea-
sures inﬂ  uence aggregate economic activity, the so-called credit channel of mone-
tary policy (groundbreaking contributions include: Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 
1992; Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Hubbard, 1995; 
Kashyap and Stein, 1995; and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; more recent papers 
include: Iacovielo, 2005; Gertler et al., 2007; Monacelli, 2009; Van den Heuvel, 
2009; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect has been consi-
dered one of the main mechanisms on which the credit channel is based (this chan-
nel consists of the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel).
That is, the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect forms the theoretical background for the 
balance sheet channel. According to the balance sheet channel, a change in mone-
tary policy impacts on the balance sheet (net worth) of ﬁ  rms.8 A change in balan-
ce sheet affects their borrowing and, consequently, the overall aggregate econo-
mic activity. In particular, if changes in monetary policy are deﬁ  ned as exogenou-
sly induced changes in the interest rate (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998), then mone-
tary policy changes can have effect on all three components of ﬁ  rms’ net worth. 
For example, an increase in interest rate should induce a decrease in the market 
value of ﬁ  rms’ illiquid assets simply because the market will discount future re-
turns from those kinds of asset by a higher interest rate. Further, an increase in the 
interest rate may increase ﬁ  rms’ indebtedness to the extent that corporate loans 
have variable interest rates. Finally, since the policy-induced increase in interest 
rate depresses the aggregate demand, ﬁ  rms’ liquid asset ﬂ  ows, that is, ﬂ  ows from 
existing economic activity, can also decrease due to a decline in demand for pro-
ducts. Thus, the monetary policy-induced increase in interest rate pushes all three 
components of net worth in the “same”, unfavourable direction. That increases the 
external ﬁ  nance premium and, consequently, depresses the aggregate economic 
activity. For the same reasons the borrowing, hence also the investment and spen-
ding of households, should be affected in the same manner. 
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect has recently been used to explain the bank lending 
channel as well. According to the bank lending channel, monetary policy can in-
ﬂ  uence aggregate economic activity through policy-induced changes in loan sup-
ply. In short, the tightening of monetary policy reduces banks’ lending capacity 
which, in turn, causes a decline in loan supply and/or tightening of the lending 
8 In the monetary literature the financial accelerator effect and the term net worth are also known as the bala-






















































































































184 conditions, and the reduction in overall economic activity. Opinions differ about 
what kind of monetary policy changes credit supply, and for what reasons. The 
“traditional” view focuses on the effects of reserve requirements and the central 
bank’s open market operations.9 The recent literature, however, has focused on the 
potential effect of monetary policy changes on banks’ net worth (capital), and re-
sulting change in loan supply due to the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect10 (see for exam-
ple: Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 2002; Aikman and Vi-
leghe, 2004; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Van den Heuvel, 2002, 2009). Na-
mely, to the extent that changes in the short-term interest rate affect banks’ capital 
they might also, due to information asymmetry, affect banks’ ability to attract
funds and, hence, their loans supply. This literature suggests that an increase in the 
interest rate might reduce banks’ capital through two channels. The ﬁ  rst channel is 
recognised by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), who note an increase in banks’ holdi-
ngs of volatile securities and derivative instruments. This might increase the sensi-
tivity of bank lending to changes in the interest rate. For example, a rise in interest 
rate lowers the value of securities. That reduces banks’ capital and negatively
affects their ability to attract funds. The second channel is proposed by Van den 
Heuvel (2002, 2009). It arises due to a maturity mismatch between banks’ assets 
and liabilities. Namely, deposits usually have a shorter time duration than bank 
loans. This means that interest rates on bank loans are slower to adjust to changes 
in the interest rates than the interest rates on their liabilities, simply because loans, 
on average, are less frequently (re)negotiated. Hence, this mismatch should decrease 
banks’ proﬁ  tability and reduce their capital. Taken together, when the central bank 
increases the short-term interest rate both effects should have a decrease in banks’ 
capital as a consequence. Reduction in banks’ capital will increase the agency 
costs of collecting funds and, in turn, negatively affect banks’ ability to attract 
funds. The limitations in banks’ deposit collection will then cause decline in loan 
supply and the reduction in overall economic activity.
5 DISCUSSION
The literature reviewed offers a coherent theoretical framework in which econo-
mic shocks are ampliﬁ   ed and propagated due to information-based ﬁ  nancial 
market frictions. The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect demonstrates that irrationalities 
such as herd behaviour, animal spirit or myopia, are not necessary to explain the 
active role of ﬁ  nancial markets in real economic activity, and that ﬁ  nancial markets 
can have an active role in short-run output ﬂ  uctuations even when all economic 
agents conform to the postulates of rational expectations and optimising beha-
viour. 
9 According to this point of view, an increase in the reserve requirement level or/and the central bank’s open 
market sales will contract the funds banks have at their disposal for lending and so reduce loan supply. The 
underlying assumptions are that banks are not able to easily compensate for lost deposits and that borrowers 
are unable to frictionlessly substitute bank loans with other sources of finance.






















































































































185 The ﬁ  nancial accelerator literature also offers a plausible ﬁ  rst principle based ex-
planation of the proximate causes of the recent crisis. If we consider the collapse 
of the subprime mortgages market in September of 2007 as the initial economic 
shock, then this shock can hardly be categorised as large. Although the size of 
subprime mortgages market was large in absolute terms ($0.7 trillion) it was less 
than 0.5 percent of the size of US ﬁ  nancial markets (Bank of England, 2007). 
Hence, it is puzzling how default on these loans could become the source of the 
most severe crisis of this era. A possible explanation can be summarised as fol-
lows. The collapse of the US subprime mortgage market forced ﬁ  nancial interme-
diaries to write off hundreds billion dollars in bad loans and caused an erosion of 
their capitalization. Deterioration of intermediaries’ balance sheets harmed their 
ability to raise funds, which reduced their lending capacity. Consequently, lending 
standards that non-ﬁ  nancial borrowers face tightened and loan supply declined. 
The credit crunch adversely affected investment, consumption and property prices 
that are sensitive to the free ﬂ  ow of credits and lending standards. Decline in house 
and real estate prices caused erosion of households’ and ﬁ  rms’ net worth and ac-
cordingly a decline in their debt capacity. Weakening of non-ﬁ  nancial borrowers’ 
debt capacity further increased external ﬁ  nancial premium and ampliﬁ  ed existing 
decline of investment, consumption and output. Decline of the aggregate econo-
mic activity, the ensuing rise in unemployment and reduction in housing prices 
increased the amount of nonperforming loans. This reduced intermediaries’ proﬁ  -
tability and further deteriorated their net worth with another pro-cyclical feedback 
into the aggregate economic activity. Overall, the initial shock to the ﬁ  nancial 
sector itself seems to have caused and/or intensiﬁ  ed the deterioration of the net 
worth of all three groups of economic agents and through the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect generated a severe crisis.11
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator can also provide a theoretical background for the credit 
policy measures taken during this crisis by the Fed and many other central banks 
and ﬁ  scal authorities, which are often seen as old-fashioned and contradictory of 
modern economic theory. In particular, the Fed reacted to the current crisis using 
three types of credit policy measures: by making imperfectly secured loans to ﬁ  -
nancial institutions; by lending directly to high grade non-ﬁ  nancial borrowers; 
and by equity injection and debt guarantees to large ﬁ  nancial institutions (Gertler 
and Kiyotaki, 2010). The same or similar measures to facilitate credit ﬂ  ows and 
boost ﬁ  nancial institutions’ net worth were taken by monetary and ﬁ  scal authori-
ties of many other countries as well. Using the dynamic general equilibrium mo-
11 It is important to stress that this is just one of the possible explanations of proximate causes. The ultimate 
causes of the recent financial crisis are still a matter of debate and intensive research. At the moment a few 
questions seem to be crucial with respect to the ultimate causes of recent financial crisis. What was the source 
of excessive liquidity on the financial markets of the US and other industrialized countries in the years before 
outbreak of recent financial crisis? To what extent did financial innovations and financial derivatives, which 
had been supposed to make the financial system more stable by diversifying risk and rising liquidity, amp-
lify the problem of information asymmetry? Why did financial institutions engage in excessive risk taking? 
To what extent might the principal-agent problem between the owners and managers of financial institutions 






















































































































186 del in which the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect emerges due to changes in banks’ net 
worth Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) demonstrated that implementation of this kind 
of measures can have beneﬁ  cial effect on the aggregate economic activity during 
the crisis by reducing the rise in the external ﬁ  nance premium. The results of Ger-
tler and Kiyotaki’s (2010) model simulations also demonstrated that the net bene-
ﬁ  ts from these credit market measures increase with the severity of the crises, 
which helps to account for why it makes sense to employ them only in the cases 
of severe recession. These results are important because they demonstrate that 
these measures are in line with modern, ﬁ  rst-principle based macroeconomic 
theory.
Theoretical consistency and the ability to offer a plausible explanation of the recent 
crisis has drawn attention of a broader economic community toward the idea of the 
ﬁ  nancial accelerator. However, despite its recent popularity in the broader econo-
mic community, the empirical evidence on the economic signiﬁ  cance of this effect 
is still relatively weak. The empirical estimates of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect 
face three main difﬁ  culties. Problems that are commonly acknowledged are: po-
tential endogeneity that hampers any evaluation of aggregate data, and inability 
directly to observe and measure the external ﬁ  nance premium.
A problem that has not been recognised, and that makes an empirical assessment 
of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect even more difﬁ  cult is that the existence of a 
procyclical external ﬁ  nance premium is a sufﬁ  cient but not a necessary condition 
for the existence of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect.
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect suggests that adverse economic disturbances lead 
to a decrease in aggregate investment due to a shift in the credits supply curve 
caused by increases in asymmetric information costs. Hence, it seems that empiri-
cal tests can focus on the possible existence of procyclical movements in aggre  gate 
credit ﬂ  ows, that is, the existence of a positive correlation between aggregate credit 
and aggregate output movements. The strong positive correlation between these 
variables is, in general, observed in aggregate time series (see for example: Del-
l’Ariccia and Garibaldi, 2005). However, the joint test based on aggregate data is 
unlikely to be informative about the existence of ﬁ  nancial accelerator (Bernanke et 
al., 1996). This testing procedure suffers from the so-called identiﬁ  cation equiva-
lence problem. The positive correlation between aggregate credit changes and 
GDP changes can be caused not just by movements in credit supply but by move-
ments in credit (investment) demand as well. For example, King and Plosser (1984) 
demonstrated that procyclical movements of aggregate credit ﬂ  ows can be genera-
ted by a frictionless real business cycle model, in which changes in aggregate cre-
dits ﬂ  ows are caused solely by shifts in investment demand. The inability to distin-
guish between different sources of observed colinearity makes this testing proce-
dure unsuitable. Hence, the empirical literature has followed alternative identiﬁ  ca-






















































































































187 The ﬁ  rst group of studies focuses on the relationship between variables that are 
meant to proxy the external ﬁ  nance premium and aggregate economic activity. 
That is, in the majority of models, the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect is based on a 
countercyclical external ﬁ  nance premium that is not directly observable. Gertler 
and Lown (1999) argued that the development of a high-yield debt market (the 
“junk bonds” market) in the early 1980s in the US can potentially resolve this 
problem. According to Gertler and Lown (1999) a high-yield bond spread12 should 
provide a good overall indicator of the external ﬁ  nance premium since ﬁ  rms that 
raise funds by issuing high-yield bonds are the kind of ﬁ  rms that can be supposed 
to face frictions on credit markets. On the other hand, AAA rated ﬁ  rms are very 
unlikely to face asymmetric information problems on ﬁ  nancial markets. During 
recession the cost of ﬁ  nance (bond rate), according to the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect, should increase more for ﬁ  rms that are more exposed to asymmetric infor-
mation. Hence, the high-yield bond spread should rise. The reverse should be true 
over the economy expansionary phase. The results of their empirical tests conﬁ  r-
med this prediction of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator theory. In particular, they found a 
strong inverse relationship between high-yield spread and output gap. The results 
of Gertler and Lown (1999) were conﬁ  rmed by Mody and Taylor (2004), who 
recorded a high negative correlation between high-yield spread and annual per-
centage changes in real GDP. Recently, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) found 
that price-cost margins for US banks are also consistently countercyclical, which 
can be an indicator of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect in the banking sector. Al-
though these results are consistent with the theory of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator, a 
few issues challenge robustness and raise some concerns about this testing ap-
proach. First, whether high-yield bond spread is good proxy for external ﬁ  nance 
premium is a matter of debate; AAA rated ﬁ  rms are on average considerably lar-
ger than ﬁ  rms that raise funds on the high-yield bond market. The recent econo-
mic crisis has demonstrated that size (still) matters. Hence, the evidence that the 
bond rates of AAA rated ﬁ  rms increase less during recession than bond rates on 
the high-yield bond market can reﬂ  ect investors belief in the “too big to fail” 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the large companies are usually more internationally di-
versiﬁ  ed, which can make them less exposed to change in domestic GDP. There-
fore, the negative correlation between high-yield spread and annual percentage 
changes in real GDP can also be the results of the larger international diversiﬁ  ca-
tion of AAA rated ﬁ  rms. Second, identiﬁ  cation of a countercyclical external ﬁ  nance 
premium does not necessary imply that this premium intensiﬁ  es the effects of 
aggregate shocks. Third, the results of these studies are based only on US data, 
using a relatively short series, with only one signiﬁ  cant recession in the cases of 
Gertler and Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2004). Fourth, due to the short 
time period and lack of data for other countries, the potentials for further applica-
tion of this approach are limited. Finally, the existence of external ﬁ  nance pre-
mium is not a necessary condition for the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. In particular, 
12 The high-yield bond spread is the difference between high-yield bond rate and the corresponding rate for 






















































































































188 the information asymmetry on ﬁ  nancial (equity) markets can amplify and propa-
gate economic shocks because procyclical changes in economic agents’ net worth 
produce countercyclical change in economic agents’ exposure to risk (see 
Greenwald and Stigliz, 1993). In that respect, possible ﬁ  ndings that external ﬁ  na-
nce premium is not countercyclical or that a premium does not even exist (that 
credit markets are frictionless) would not imply that the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
effect is irrelevant. 
As well as being a prediction about aggregate investment movements over time, 
the ﬁ  nancial accelerator theory also has cross sectional implications. In particular, 
ﬁ  nancial accelerator theory predicts that economic shocks should have a stronger 
inﬂ  uence on economic agents that face severe asymmetric information problems 
than on less exposed agents. The numerous panel data studies on the role of infor-
mation asymmetry in determining real investment decisions can be considered as 
the second group of studies that provide empirical evidence in support of the ﬁ  -
nancial accelerator effect. This literature employs the disaggregated (ﬁ  rm and 
bank level) data to test for the cross sectional difference in the effects of change in 
the internal source of ﬁ  nance on ﬁ  rms’ investment and banks’ lending. In brief, 
the literature was initiated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (FHP). FHP 
used Tobin’s Q investment model to test for the effect of ﬁ  nancial market imper-
fections on ﬁ  rms’ investment. Underlying the FHP approach is the premise that 
ﬁ  rms’ ability and/or the terms under which they are able to borrow, hence also 
their investment, are a function of their internal sources of ﬁ  nance (net worth)13. If 
this is the case then the estimated coefﬁ  cient on the variable that measures ﬁ  rms’ 
internal sources of ﬁ  nance (net worth) should be positive and statistically signiﬁ  -
cant when it enters the investment regression equation. Moreover, its inclusion 
should increase the explanatory power of the standard investment speciﬁ  cation. 
Finally, the estimated coefﬁ  cient and increase of the explanatory power should be 
larger for the categories of ﬁ  rms more likely to face ﬁ  nancial constraints, i.e. which 
are more exposed to the asymmetric information problem. The results of FHP 
empirical estimations were in line with these predictions supporting the hypothe-
sis that internal sources of ﬁ  nance are an important determinant of ﬁ  rms’ real in-
vestments. These ﬁ  ndings have been conﬁ  rmed by large number of empirical stu-
dies (for references and a recent review of this literature see Ćorić, 2010). Essen-
tially the same approach, with similar results, has been used to test the role of in-
formation asymmetry in determining banks’ lending decisions, that is, to test the 
credit channel of monetary policy (see for example: Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 
2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; and Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).14 However, 
due to some serious shortcomings of this testing approach, these results cannot be 
considered robust evidence of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. For example, the 
ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect is not in the primary focus of this literature, hence, this 
13 Firms’ internal source of finance is usually proxied by cash flow.
14 Empirical evidence consistent with some implications of the financial accelerator effect can also be found 






















































































































189 literature does not assess to what extent the ﬁ  rms’ net worth is procyclical and 
what the potential aggregate effects of these ﬁ  ndings are. Furthermore, the recent 
research has produced three results that cast doubt on the evidence for ﬁ  nancing 
constraints from the studies based on FHP methodology (Cummins, Hassett and 
Oliner, 2006). First, the cash-ﬂ  ow effect either disappears or becomes much smal-
ler when one controls for the measurement error in Tobin’s Q. Second, positive 
cash-ﬂ  ow coefﬁ  cients can be generated without any ﬁ  nancing constraints. Third, 
assuming that ﬁ  nancing constraints exist, the size of the estimated cash-ﬂ  ow coef-
ﬁ  cient need not be positively related to the degree of the constraints, which under-
cuts the key identifying assumption of FHP methodology (for a detailed analysis 
of these researches see Ćorić, 2010). Although at the moment this literature does 
not provide robust results, this is a potentially promising line of research. First, the 
recent methodology for identiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancing constraints proposed by Ho-
vakimian and Titman (2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007) is less subject to 
the above critiques. Second, since this estimation procedure does not test for the 
existence of external ﬁ  nance premium it is not subject to the critique that the ex-
ternal ﬁ  nance premium is not a necessary condition for the existence of the ﬁ  nan-
cial accelerator effect. Finally, data for this kind of empirical analysis are relati-
vely available, at least for developed countries.
Overall, despite ample theoretical research based on the ﬁ  nancial accelerator ef-
fect, more research is needed to assess the empirical signiﬁ  cance of these models. 
The necessity of more empirical researches is especially urgent, for two reasons. 
The ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect predicts that this effect should be stronger the 
deeper the recession is (due to the lower level of net worth). This implication 
seems to contradict common belief in the business and economic community (see 
for example, Chatterjeee, 2010), that in the deepest stages of recession the low 
credit level is caused by lack of credit demand caused by great uncertainty and 
low business conﬁ  dence.15 Second, the recent literature demonstrates that the ﬁ  -
nancial accelerator effect theoretically can go in the opposite direction, “decelera-
ting” economic shocks and reducing output volatility (see: Iacoviello, 2005; Hou-
se, 2006; and Christiansen and Dib, 2008). Iacoviello (2005), for example, de-
monstrated that in a case in which debt contracts are written in the terms of the 
nominal interest rate, as is usually done, the additional possibility of Fisher’s debt-
deﬂ  ation effect emerges. Whether the analysed effect is going to work as accele-
rator or rather as “decelerator” of economic ﬂ  uctuations depends then on the na-
ture of the economic shocks. In particular, in the case of a negative aggregate de-
mand shock, decline in inﬂ  ation ampliﬁ  es any reduction in borrowers’ net worth, 
due to an increase in the real value of borrowers’ outstanding debt obligations, and 
hence, exaggerates the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. Conversely, in the case of 
adverse aggregate supply shock a rise in inﬂ  ation works in the opposite direction, 
15 The rationale for expansive short-run fiscal policy during recessions is also to a large extent based on the 
assumption that in recessions (especially deep recessions) government spending should act to substitute for 
lower demand for private investments (see for example, recommendations for fiscal policy during the recent 






















































































































190 reducing real value of borrowers’ outstanding debt obligations. In that respect 
adverse supply shocks can be beneﬁ  cial for the borrowers’ net worth and conse-
quently “decelerate” an economic shock. 
With respect to possible further theoretical research, we suggest two new aspects 
to expand the existing concept of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect.
Existing literature accounts for the problem of information asymmetry between 
economic agents, but not for the information asymmetry “within economic age-
nts”. In particular, in many ﬁ  rms, especially in banks, the owners are not the ma-
nagers. Asymmetric information between owners and managers results in what is 
called the principal-agent problem. This problem is potentially important for the 
ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect and its introduction in the ﬁ  nancial accelerator fra-
mework can be informative. Namely, an economic agent’s net worth is important 
for lenders because high net worth implies that an economic agent will behave 
more diligently and/or take less risk since its losses in the case of bankruptcy will 
be larger. However, in a case in which managers are not the owners of a ﬁ  rm or 
bank, their losses in the case of bankruptcy (loss of reputation) seem to be inde-
pendent of the ﬁ  rm’s or bank’s net worth. Therefore when the principal-agent 
problem exists, an economic agent’s net worth can lose its relevance for the len-
der. It is possible to speculate that the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect would still exist 
in this case since a higher economic agent net worth also implies a lower probabi-
lity of bankruptcy, and also to speculate that in this case it is relative rather than 
absolute net worth that would be important to a lender. However, this should be 
investigated in more detail.
The literature also presumes that only an individual economic agent’s net worth is 
important. The underlying premise is that a lender is able to observe a borrower’s 
net worth. This assumption can be easily justiﬁ  ed when banks are lenders. Howe-
ver, it seems less justiﬁ  ed when banks are borrowers. Although banks are forced 
to release information on their capitalization on a regular basis it still remains 
doubtful how much ﬁ  rms, and especially households are informed about their net 
worth. For example, even if households do have information about these data re-
leases it is very doubtful whether they have enough knowledge to understand 
them and compare capitalization among different banks. Consequently, it would 
be useful to analyse whether in the case of banks, information about soundness of 
the overall banking sector that can be communicated through the media or central 
banks’ announcements; what the function of banks’ aggregate net worth can be is 
also important. With respect to the results of existing ﬁ  nancial accelerator models 
this would not make difference since their mathematical formulation is based on 
the representative agent approach. However, this might be important for the ex-
























































































































The severity of the recent economic crisis raises a question about the role of ﬁ  nan-
cial markets in modern market economies. This review concentrates on the rela-
tionship between information asymmetry on ﬁ   nancial markets and short-run 
aggregate economic ﬂ  uctuations, the so-called ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. 
We found that the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect offers a consistent, ﬁ  rst-principle 
based, explanation of the relationship between ﬁ  nancial markets and short-run 
aggregate economic ﬂ  uctuations based on informational asymmetry on ﬁ  nancial 
markets. This effect also offers a plausible rationalization of the severe conse-
quences of the subprime mortgages market’s crash in September of 2007. Finally, 
this effect, or more precisely, the prevention of its even stronger manifestation, 
provides a theoretical background for the credit policy measures taken during the 
recent crisis by many central banks and ﬁ  scal authorities.
These features made the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect recently very popular in the 
broader economic community. Despite its popularity, and the recent ﬁ  nancial cri-
sis, which seems to conﬁ  rm its signiﬁ  cance, the empirical literature has faced se-
rious challenges in the empirical identiﬁ  cation of this effect. Overall, we found 
that existing empirical literature is still unable to provide robust assessments of 
the size and economic relevance of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator effect. More empiri-
cal research is necessary especially because the recent literature demonstrates that 
this effect theoretically could go in the opposite direction and reduce output vola-
tility as well. Finally, we made a case for two new lines of enquiry. In particular, 
we found that it might be informative to introduce the principal-agent problem 
between owners and managers into the ﬁ  nancial accelerator framework; and also 
to consider the role of the aggregate net worth of banking sector in the ﬁ  nancial 
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